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Abstract: This study has examined the results of SOE policy by 
comparing two provinces in Turkey, one that was a would-be 
beneficiary of this policy and the other not. Statistical data and 
anecdotal evidence from in-depth interviews show that the SOEs 
increased labor costs, discouraged private entrepreneurship and 
guided locals to political, rather than productive solutions to 
their economic problems; regional development in the province 
in which SOEs dominated the regional economy was hindered. 
These results are in line with the reported outcomes of SOE 
policy adopted by Italian governments in order to promote 
development in southern Italy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State owned enterprises, entrepreneurship and local 
development: A case from Turkey 
 
1. Introduction 
From the Great Depression in 1929 to late the 1970’s, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), like other forms of state intervention, 
were regarded by academics and policy makers as an effective 
tool to promote economic development at regional and national 
levels. Strong support from a variety of quarters stimulated the 
establishment of new SOEs and increased their weight, in both 
developing and developed economies, during this period 
(Toninelli, 2000; Short, 1984).1  
Although economic development of a nation or a region was one 
of the primary economic motivations2 behind the establishment 
SOEs, in many countries they were assigned to new political and 
social targets by politicians which were contradictory to 
economic ones. Pursuing multiple aims forced the managers of 
SOEs to sacrifice economic aims to achieve the others (Basu, 
2008). Furthermore, even when confusion about the different 
targets was absent, shortcomings in the governance and financial 
structure of SOEs, together with the lack of motivating market 
competition all combined to work against their efficient 
operation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Therefore, by the late 
1970s, the contribution of public enterprises to economic and 
social development had been called into question. They were 
criticized as being a source of inefficiency in economies and an 
obstacle to economic development.3   
Parallel developments occurred in Turkey, too, during this time. 
The state, which had played a regulatory role in the economy in 
the early years of the Republic, began to intervene directly after 
                                                 
1 Data collected from various developed and developing countries show that 
in the mid-70s SOEs accounted for similar shares of GDP in both groups of 
countries (approximately 9 percent) notwithstanding, differences within each 
group. The contribution of SOEs to capital formation was double in 
developing countries (Short, 1984).  
2 The other was correcting market failures. 
3 For a brief survey of different country experiences, see Rondinelli (2008). 
the 1930s. In the atmosphere of the global economic recession, 
and with the influence of government staff impressed by the 
industrial advances of the Soviet Union, SOEs grew in range 
and scope, in order to meet developmental targets of the 
Republic. Even, during the era of the Democrat Party, which 
came into power in 1950 promising to privatize government 
enterprises, the number of state-owned enterprises continued to 
increase more rapidly, in fact, than they had in the previous eras, 
classified as ‘statist’.4 The growth of state-owned enterprises 
went unchecked until views on state-owned enterprises turned 
negative in the 1980s continuously increasing in number and 
expanding to include areas difficult to associate with 
developmental aims, such as meat and fish, retailing, groceries, 
the film industry and nightclub management (Yenal, 1999).  
Even though the views that see SOEs as engines of development 
has lost too much ground since late 1970s, discussions about the 
effectiveness of SOE policy or state intervention as a whole on 
economic development is still continuing. Many studies agree 
that active state involvement in the economy played a significant 
role in the economic development of the West (Adelman, 1999) 
and developing countries (Kohli, 2004; Brohman, 1996), 
including Turkey (Buğra, 1994; Kepenek and Yentürk, 1994, 
Boratav, 1982). However, even these studies mention that not all 
intervention policies are equally effective and similar policies 
have differing consequences depending on the environment in 
which the policy is adopted.5  
The aim of this paper is to discuss the effectiveness of SOE 
policy on regional development, based on a case from Turkey. 
First, the province of Sivas, one of the 81 provinces in Turkey, 
where public enterprises were established intensively from the 
early years of the Republic onwards, is compared – in terms of 
general economic performance and development of the private 
sector – with the province of Çorum, where the first SOE was 
opened in the 1950s and state industrial investments remained 
very limited. The results of this comparison indicate that Çorum 
                                                 
4 The production and added value of public enterprises was doubled in real 
terms in the decade 1950-1960, when the Democrat Party was in power 
(Yenal, 1999). 
5 See e.g. Buğra (1994) and Özcan (2006) for Turkey, and Kohli (2004) for 
various other countries. 
out performed Sivas in terms of both economic development in 
general and private entrepreneurship in particular.  
The second stage of the study is devoted to explaining the 
difference between the provinces. To this end, in-depth 
interviews with businessmen and representatives of chambers of 
commerce and industry were carried out in the two provinces. 
Additionally, the limited historical data available on these 
provinces is also employed in order to interpret the results. The 
combined findings of the field study and supporting data 
indicate that, notwithstanding the significance of other factors, 
the state’s massive involvement in the economy of Sivas had a 
destructive affect on both quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurship and, accordingly, development of the province, 
in contrast to what had been expected from the SOEs.  
This finding is not peculiar to the case discussed here – SOEs 
failed to meet developmental aims in other countries also. The 
Italian experience is probably the best known example in this 
regard. Italian governments used SOEs, along with other 
intervention tools, in order to close the developmental gap 
between the rich North and poor South. However, studies show 
that SOEs in Italy also hindered the development of private 
entrepreneurship and thus were unable to make a contribution to 
the well-being of the South. In this paper, therefore, a special 
emphasis is given to the Italian case and unintended 
consequences of SOEs on private entrepreneurship and 
development there, and, accordingly, the two countries are 
compared. A comparison of experiences in the two countries – 
of Sivas in Turkey and Italy’s South – indicates distinct 
similarities between the two, and thus consolidates the findings 
of studies (of both of the present case and the Italian case). 
Although the consequences – especially unintended – of SOE 
policies in different countries are discussed in many studies, the 
number of studies that focus specifically on this issue of their 
impact on private enterprise is very limited. The situation is 
worse for Turkey.  To my knowledge, there is only one study 
(Yıldırım, 2007) that discusses the negative effects of SOE 
policy on entrepreneurship in Turkey. This paper will thus 
contribute to the literature in this context, especially for Turkey. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section 
discusses the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
development and the unintended consequences of SOE policy 
on entrepreneurshipthese for (regional) development in Italy.  
Section 3 describes the developments in the economies of Sivas 
and Çorum between the years 1930 and 1980, the heyday of the 
interventionist policies, and the consequences of these. In 
Section 4, outcomes of the SOE policies in Turkey are compared 
with those in southern Italy.. The final section discusses the 
results and their policy implications. 
 
2. SOEs, entrepreneurship and local development: lessons 
from the Italian experience 
Although it is mentioned as one of the four production factors in 
economics textbooks, entrepreneurship is less frequently 
handled in academic works than the others.6 The history of 
studies emphasizing the role of the entrepreneur goes back to the 
works of Adam Smith and Cantillon, however, while major 
contributions were made in the 20th century and the number of 
studies has flourished in recent years.  
The role of the entrepreneur in economic development was first 
formulated by Joseph Schumpeter (1963), who emphasized 
innovative entrepreneurship as a prime cause of economic 
development. Further studies pointed to various other ways in 
which entrepreneurship may affect economic development. Stel 
et al. (2005) summarizes these contributions under four 
headings: entering new products or market processes, increasing 
competition, introducing variations of existing products and 
services in the market, and working more efficiently and for 
longer hours. This analysis is supported by various empirical 
studies (Caree and Thurik 2005; Stel et al, 2005). 
Although the role of entrepreneurship on development is 
recognized by many scholars, a distinction between productive 
and unproductive entrepreneurship is also made. The 
entrepreneurial potential of an economy may shift to either 
productive activities like introducing innovative products or 
                                                 
6 Probably because of difficulties in defining and measuring entrepreneurship 
(Stel et. al., 2005). 
unproductive activities like rent-seeking. The direction of the 
shift is determined by the ‘rules of the game’ as set by 
governments. Entrepreneurs prefer unproductive activities, 
which have a destructive effect on development, when the 
returns of these activities are higher than those of productive 
activities. Therefore entrepreneurship will tend to make a 
contribution to development only if governments adopt policies 
that favor productive activities (Baumol, 1990). 
In capitalist economies the major contribution to development is 
expected from private entrepreneurs, so SOEs were assigned a 
complementary role to private entrepreneurship rather then 
being established as an alternative. Governments invested in 
those fields where private agents were thought to be unable to 
invest either because of lack of capital or low returns compared 
to other opportunities in the market. Governments also aimed to 
promote private entrepreneurship through SOEs, by providing 
cheap inputs to and creating extra demand for the private sector 
(Toninelli, 2000).  
Despite these initial intentions, however, SOE policy in many 
instances either failed to promote entrepreneurship or, worse,  
promoted unproductive entrepreneurship only and was unable 
reach developmental targets. The Italian experience is a good 
example in this regard. Italian governments from the 1950s used 
all the usual intervention tools, including establishing SOEs, in 
order to close the developmental gap between northern and 
southern Italy. Yet these efforts did not succeed in bridging the 
gap. Per capita income, consumption and investment in the 
South were still well below the North in the 1990s, and 
unemployment twice as high (Boltho et al, 1997). 
The role of SOEs in this failure is explained in several different 
ways. Florio (1996) refers to the size of the companies involved. 
Italian governments subsidized large firms, both private and 
public, so as to promote development in backward regions. The 
idea behind this policy was that these firms would promote the 
birth and growth of small and medium size firms around them. 
However empirical evidence points to the opposite. The large, 
integrated firms made no contribution to the development of 
entrepreneurship in their regions. On the contrary, by utilizing 
the limited entrepreneurial potential of the region in their huge 
production units, they hindered the realization of this potential.    
Italian governments used SOEs as a form of wealth 
redistribution from the rich North to the poor South, by 
employing a huge number of southern Italians in the SOEs. Due 
to populist politics and strong unions, workers in these 
enterprises gained relatively high wages and generous social 
rights (despite their low productivity as compared to the 
northern counterparts). Income transfer through this SOE 
strategy of higher wages led to several unintended consequences 
on the development of the South. 
First, high wages accompanying low productivity raised costs 
and reduced competitiveness in the region. The increase in labor 
costs intimidated new investments to the South and moved 
exiting ones to other regions, which in turn led to higher 
unemployment and migration (Boltho et al., 1997). Second, 
local people were discouraged both from finding jobs and 
developing careers in the private sector, and from starting their 
own companies. Because of the well paid and secure jobs 
available in the public sphere, people saw their futures and 
directed their efforts there, including potential entrepreneurs, 
who opted for the relative ease of the SOEs rather than the risk 
and hard work of establishing new businesses. This all had 
significant negative effects at managerial and skilled-worker 
levels on small to medium size businesses in the region, as well 
as on the number and viability of local startup companies 
(Alessina et al., 2001). Finally, since entrepreneurs in the South 
realized that a major part of their income was determined 
through political decisions, they tended to focus on rent seeking 
rather than productive activities (Boltho et al., 1997). 
As the above mentioned studies have shown, the effects of SOE 
policy in Italy were far from promoting entrepreneurship and 
productive activities. Therefore, it is considered either that the 
policy made  no contribution to the development of the South, or 
that it actually made a negative contribution. 
 
3. A brief economic history of Sivas and Çorum since the 
beginning of the Turkish Republic7 
Sivas and Çorum are two provinces in central Turkey, near the 
Black Sea but not on the coast, and are geographically very 
close to each other8 The land area of Sivas, one of the largest 
provinces in Turkey, is more than double that of Çorum, and 
there has not been a significant change in the borders of the two 
provinces since the establishment of the Republic (See the map 
below). Accordingly, the population of Sivas has historically 
been approximately forty percent above Çorum’s.   
Historically, although several civilizations have been situated in 
this region, in 1923 when the Republic was established Sivas 
and Çorum were two rather poor provinces, the mainstay of both 
being mainly agriculture, with micro scale industries based on 
processing local resources. However, Sivas had the advantage of 
being the center of commercial activities in the region, since it 
had been administrative centre of the surrounding provinces, 
including Çorum, before the Republican period. 
3.1. Direct Investments of the State in the 1923-1980 period 
The first major economic advance of the new Republic 
following its establishment in 1923 was the development of the 
railway network. Sivas was among the first provinces to benefit 
from this move. The city of Sivas was connected by railway to 
the national capital, Ankara, in 1930, and to the nearest port, 
Samsun, which was the leading seaport city on the Turkish, 
Black Sea coast at the time, in 1932. When, as early as the 
1940s, this railway line was extended to Erzurum, the major 
economic center of the Eastern Anatolia region, as early as the 
1940s the city became the central hub for the region. Sivas’ 
connection to the national market was thus completed in the best 
manner for the conditions of the time. 
One of the first state enterprises in the province was the Sivas 
Railway Machines Establishment (DDY Cer Atölyesi). The 
                                                 
7 Unless otherwise stated, the data in this section is based on the entries for 
Sivas and Çorum in the Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Homeland Encyclopedia] (1982). 
8 With today’s road facilities, the distance between the two provincial capitals 
is 285km.  
Establishment, the foundations of which were laid in 1934 and 
finally opened in 1939, was set up to produce and maintain 
locomotives and carriages required by the Turkish Republic 
State Railways for the state network. In the following years, new 
production units, power stations and even a maintenance facility 
and apprenticeship school were added to the rapidly developing 
enterprise. By 1973, 4500 people were working for what was 
now confirmed as one of the leading national centers of railway 
stock engineering.9  
Linked to the development of the railways under the Five Year 
(Industrialization) Plans of the 1930s was the development of 
the coal and steel sector. Another SOE founded in Sivas during 
the early years of the Republic, therefore, was the Iron and Steel 
Enterprise (Divriği Demir-Çelik). Operative from 1938, this 
enterprise was located in the provincial district of Divriği, where 
rich iron deposits were located, and processed iron ore for iron 
and steel factories nationwide. In 1973, approximately 1000 
people were employed here, most of whom lived in the town of 
Divriği and its surrounding villages.10 
Other SOEs were developed in Sivas during the pre- and post-
WWII period, parallel to these public investments in the railway 
and iron and steel sectors. In 1937 it was decided that a cement 
factory should be founded to meet increasing requirements, both 
locally, in Sivas, and in the region. As a result of various delays 
in construction, the factory could only be completed in 1943. In 
1945, a ceramics factory was founded nearby, and brick and tile 
production commenced. Capacity was increased and technology 
renewed over the years in this factory, and 419 people were 
working there as of 1983. Additionally, a military uniform 
sewing plant, employing approximately 200 workers, was 
established and began operations in 1945 (Mahiroğuları, 2002). 
                                                 
9 Like other SOEs mentioned here, the name and structure of this enterprise 
changed over the years. In this case, there were changes in 1953, 1972 and 
1984, when it became the Turkish Railways Machine Industries Inc. (Türkiye 
Demiryolu Makinaları Sanayii A.Ş., TÜDEMSAŞ). See: 
http://www.tudemsas.gov.tr /  
10 Listed as one of the main railways constructed during the 1930s, the 
provincial Sivas (Divriği)-Çetinkaya route was termed the ‘Iron Line’.  
See: http://www.tcdd.gov.tr/tcdding/tarihce_ing.htm 
The state did not make any significant industrial investment in 
the province in the 1950s. The most important public investment 
in the province in the 1960s was the Sızır Hydroelectric Power 
Plant, built in 1961 to meet the increasing energy requirements 
of the district. In 1963, a carpet workshop was founded by the 
Provincial Administration in order to develop handloom carpet 
weaving in the area. In 1968, Sivas came under the scope of the 
‘priority regions for development’, which encouraged private 
sector investments. However, the incentives offered within this 
scope made a very limited impact on the development of the 
private sector.  
The most prominent industrial investments of the 1970s were 
again made by the state. These were a silk yarn and weaving 
factory with 250 employees, put into operation in 1972, and a 
dairy products factory with 28 employees, opened in 1976.11 
Additionally, a feed factory was founded in 1975, for which the 
capital was provided largely by public organizations.  
In Çorum, industrialization was limited from the start to small 
ventures in the private sector. The first SOE in the city was a 
cement factory, established in 1957. The factory was the largest 
factory in the province when it went into operation, employing 
approximately 250 workers. The second investment was a dairy 
products factory, operative from 1977. Apart from these two 
factories, the only other planned SOEs were two factories 
decided on in 1976, but the construction of which was later 
halted.12 
 
3.2. Comparing the performances of the two cities  
Sivas and Çorum had similar economic conditions at the 
beginning of the Republic, but a gap developed between them in 
favor of Çorum which widened over time. Although Sivas began 
the Republican period with some major advantages – its 
historical positioning as an administrative center, siting as a 
regional railway hub and natural resources of iron ore deposits – 
                                                 
11 Employee numbers are for the years 1982-3.  
12 Of these factories, the Çorum Sugar Factory did eventually start operating, 
but only in 1991. 
these were not translated into economic prosperity. In fact, by 
comparison with its near neighbor, Çorum, it lost ground. 
By 1982, the per capita GDP in Sivas had dropped to just 82 
percent of that of Çorum, falling to as low as 63 percent by 1987 
(Özötün, 1988). Parallel to economic development, 
unemployment was also significantly reduced in Çorum. 
Between the years 1980 and 1985, whilst the unemployment rate 
in Sivas was consistent with the national average, in Çorum it 
was approximately half of this (DİE, 2004).13   
The economic performance of Çorum attracted public attention. 
Its was cited among the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, those cities in 
Anatolia which performed particularly well in the post-1980s 
period. The interest of the academic community followed the 
interest of the public, and economic development in the 
province of Çorum became the subject of academic studies 
(Eraydın, 2002; Keyman and Lorosdağı, 2010). 
In the area of entrepreneurship, Çorum exhibited a higher 
performance compared to Sivas. Table 1 shows the number of 
self-employed as a proportion of the working population, 
according to the censuses conducted between the years 1950-
1985. As can be seen, this figure was consistently higher in 
Çorum than in Sivas, particularly in manufacturing industry, the 
sector most likely to be effected by the SOEs with their almost 
exclusive orientation to industrial production and services. In 
some years, the proportion of the self-employed in the 
manufacturing industry in Çorum was almost double that of 
Sivas.  
Table 1. about here 
Another indicator of the development of the private sector in 
Sivas and Çorum is derived from the General Industry and 
Workplaces Census conducted by State Institute of Statistics in 
1980. According to the census results, the number of small 
industrial enterprises in 1980 was 1,275 in Sivas but 1,891 in 
Çorum, almost 50% higher. This is all the more striking as an 
absolute figure, given that the size (population) of Sivas was so 
much greater than Çorum’s.  
                                                 
13 1980 unemployment rates: Turkey 3.6% Sivas 3.9%, Çorum 1.8%. 1985: 
Turkey 4.7% Sivas 4.3%, Çorum 2.9%. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of small businesses operative in 
1980 according to establishment date. This provides a picture of 
the historical development of private14 entrepreneurship in both 
cities. As seen from the table, the number of enterprises 
established in Çorum was above that in Sivas in every five-year 
period after 1923. Although interest in Çorum as an Anatolian 
Tiger is a relatively recent development, it has in fact been more 
successful than Sivas in terms of small business start ups 
throughout the modern period. 
Table 2. about here 
As a matter of fact, studies also attribute the successful 
economic performance of Çorum to its success in creating 
private entrepreneurs. Research by Eraydın (2002) in particular 
has demonstrated that a large majority of the owners of the 
industrial companies in Çorum are from the province. And 
developing their capital and knowledge bases into the 1980s, 
these and other private entrepreneurs acquired the potential to 
make good use of the opportunities created by the policies 
implemented subsequently, which indeed they did .  
 
4. Can the Italian experience explain the difference in 
performance? 
As a result of large scale state investments which continued until 
the mid-1970s, SOEs played a huge role in the economy of 
Sivas, like in South Italy, while the role of SOEs remained 
limited in Çorum. In the manufacturing industry survey of 1971, 
whilst the proportion of those working for SOEs was 96 percent 
in Sivas, this figure was 40 percent in Çorum. The contribution 
of SOEs to industrial output was 85 percent in Sivas, as opposed 
to 59 percent in Çorum (DİE, 1971). Moreover, the state was a 
major employer in Sivas not only in industry but also in the 
service sector. Thousands of people in Sivas were working for 
government bodies like the Directorate of Highways, 
Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, etc. In fact, by 1984 70 
                                                 
14 As the public enterprises tended to be medium-to-large size institutions 
(i.e. employing more than the 10-person limit used here), it can safely be 
assumed that all of the enterprises included in this census were private 
concerns.  
percent of salaried people in Sivas, half of the entire population 
of the province, were employed in the public sector (Çokgezen 
and Altun, 2010).  
The concentration of SOEs in Sivas clearly also resulted in high 
rates of unionization and labor costs, as in southern Italy. The 
expectation that SOEs would have relatively high rates of 
unionization is born out by the figures for the two Turkish 
provinces. Of the workers benefiting from collective agreements 
in the two provinces, 76 percent in Sivas and 58 percent in 
Çorum were working in the public sector, both figures 
significantly higher than the proportion of workers employed by 
the state. Given the higher rate of SOE employment in Sivas, 
therefore, this should be expected to translate into a greatly 
raised rate of union membership in Sivas. And indeed, 
unionization did occur at a much higher level in Sivas than in 
Çorum. The number of workers benefiting from collective 
agreements made in the years 1972-79 was 23,647 in Sivas, but 
just 6,156 in Çorum (Yurt Ansiklopedisi, 1982) 
High rates of unionization would be expected to go with high 
rates of pay and other employee benefits. Again, the statistics 
bear this out for the cases in question. In the early 1970s, whilst 
the average annual salary in the manufacturing industry in Sivas 
was 16.7 thousand TL (Turkish Liras), it was 14 thousand in 
Çorum and the average wages in the private manufacturing 
sector in Sivas were also 20 percent higher than in Çorum (DİE, 
1971). This does lend credence to the parallel of Sivas with 
southern Italy and the idea that high SOEs salaries had a knock 
on effect on labor costs in general.  
Remuneration would obviously be a prime consideration in 
attracting people to the SOEs, but the advantage of good pay 
gained by those working for SOEs was not limited to high 
wages.  Job security and social facilities (Apak et al, 1952) such 
as lodging, school, crèche, and free lunch  were at least as 
effective as wages in making jobs in public enterprises 
appealing.  
The attraction of the SOEs is confirmed by personal 
recollection. Interviewees in Sivas mentioned that, in the past, 
public employees were the most affluent and prestigious group 
there. Several people mentioned that fathers would want their 
daughters to marry a worker in the public sector. Finding a job 
in a state enterprise was the dream of every young man, and 
families would put their effort into finding a connection, 
especially political, so as to be able to place their sons in a 
vacant position in the public sphere.  
So did the SOEs act as disincentives for entrepreneurship? The 
advantages of working for a SOE in this regard are definitely 
testified to by businessmen in Sivas. All of those interviewed for 
this research agreed that attractive opportunities offered by 
public enterprises had rendered entrepreneurship less appealing 
than a position in public sector. As described by a local car 
dealer: 
‘The ones who worked for the Railway Establishment had the 
right to pass his position on to his son when he retired. Ready 
job. Good income. Free coal for heating. Free train pass. Who 
goes into business?’ 15  
This picture is completed by another interviewee, who migrated 
to Istanbul from Sivas in 1970s, started a business there and 
later, in the 2000s, opened a branch back in his hometown: 
‘Those who were lucky enough found a job in public 
enterprises. Those who did not, moved to big cities or 
abroad.’ 16 
One of the theories supporting the use of SOEs as an engine of 
development was that the establishment of large size enterprises 
would encourage satellite entrepreneurship and spin-off 
development around the large, public venture. In some cases in 
Turkey, state manufacturing enterprises certainly did stimulate 
the establishment of private enterprises around them whose 
production was directly integrated to the production of SOEs. A 
state yarn factory set up after the Second World War in the 
Aegean city of Denizli, for instance, triggered the birth of small 
scale textile industry in the region (Eraydın, 2002).17 Spin off 
development could include a generalized contribution to the 
workforce, such as raising the skills level. Workers trained in SOEs 
might meet skilled labor needs in the private sector or be the source 
                                                 
15 Interview with Şefik Sümbüloğlu, local car dealer.  
16 Hıdır Özcan, photo/picture frame manufacturer. 
17 The entrance of the state further into the textile industry in 1964 had the 
opposite effect on private textile firms, however. 
of the entrepreneurial class. Again instances of this can be found in 
Turkey. Workers of the Military Jet Plane Maintenance Factory in 
Kayseri, a neighboring province of Sivas, became pioneers in the 
local metal goods industry both as skilled workers and as 
entrepreneurs (Öztürk, 1997). 
None of these positive effects of SOEs were realized in Sivas, 
however. State enterprises were big in size and constructed in an 
integrated form. They neither used input provided by nor provided 
inputs into local producers. Skilled workers retired from the 
railways plant in their 40s, for instance, would open a stationary 
shop or became a taxi driver, creating work for themselves, that is, 
in areas unrelated to their expertise.18 
However, developments in recent years have suggested that things 
could have been different if the SOEs had been smaller in size and 
been designed in a non-integrated form. Following the policy 
change in the economic sphere in the beginning of the 1980s, 
governments ceased investing and hiring in SOEs. Most Turkish 
SOEs have been privatized or are closed down now. Similar 
developments occurred in Sivas, as well. The exception in Sivas 
was the Railway Establishment, now TÜDEMSAŞ. It is neither 
sold, since no private entrepreneur found it profitable to operate the 
facilities, nor closed down, since no government has taken the 
political risk of closing down what is still the major employment 
source in the district. Yet, service and maintenance units have been 
closed down gradually and these works outsourced, which gave 
rise to private companies that provide these services.  
Businessmen in Sivas who in the past saw the SOEs only as an 
apparatus of income transfer from the central budget to their 
pockets, now think that a golden opportunity was missed. The 
regret is expressed in the words of Osman Yıldırım, chairman of 
Sivas Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
‘If these orders [given by the Railway Establishment] had 
been given in the past, Sivas would have had a more 
developed metal goods and machinery industry and the 
workers retired from the Establishment would have started 
their lathe shops rather than opening grocery stores.’ 
                                                 
18 The exception to the rule was one Halis Vermezoğlu, who established a 
camshaft and chilled cast plant (which in fact has today become Turkey’s 
largest). 
Mr Yıldırım claimed that the dominance of the state in Sivas’ 
economy, and other aspects of communal life, shaped the 
mentality of locals in a very ‘statist’ manner. The facts support 
Mr Yıldırm’s claim. Politics has always been important in Sivas 
– the district has given the country a disproportionate number of 
political figures, for example – and the people interviewed in 
Sivas for this research tended to explain the reasons for the 
current perceived economic problems of Sivas with reference to 
politics, like the privatizations, downsizing of SOEs, lack of 
government’s attention to the district, inadequate government 
investments, etc.  
Since the local people of Sivas tend to see the source of the 
problem in politics, they see the solution there also. The findings 
of a study that examines economic reports published by the Sivas 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry between 1965 and 2005 
(Çokgezen and Altun, 2010) demonstrate that the businessmen in 
Sivas believe that the development of their locality would be best 
facilitated by more state investment, that the financial problems of 
local companies can be solved by the provision of more state 
subsidies and incentives and through state institutions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
SOEs have been seen as an effective tool to promote regional 
development in many countries. However, in some cases at 
least, this policy seems to have hindered private 
entrepreneurship and local economic development, in contrast to 
the hopes and expectations.  
This study has examined the results of SOE policy by 
comparing two provinces in Turkey, one that was a would-be 
beneficiary of this policy and the other not. Statistical data and 
anecdotal evidence from in-depth interviews show that the SOEs 
increased labor costs, discouraged private entrepreneurship and 
guided locals to political, rather than productive solutions to 
their economic problems; regional development in the province 
in which SOEs dominated the regional economy was hindered. 
These results are in line with the reported outcomes of SOE 
policy adopted by Italian governments in order to promote 
development in southern Italy.  
These results do not lead us to a radical policy solution like 
complete rejection of the SOE policy in toto. Yet the evidence, 
derived from both Turkish and Italian cases, shows that negative 
outcomes of SOE policy on private entrepreneurship and 
regional development is more likely when SOEs dominate the 
regional economy and when constructed in integrated form, 
since the combination of these does not leave enough space for 
private companies to develop. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Ratio of self-employed to economically active population 
  1950 1955 1970 1975 1980 1985 
 T M T M T M T M T M T M 
Sivas 0.19 n.a. 0.26 n.a. 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.17 
Çorum 0.21 n.a. 0.29 n.a. 0.29 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.27 
T = Total. M = Manufacturing industry  
Source: DİE, Population Census 
 
 
Table 2. Workplaces operating in 1980 and employing 10 or less workers,  
according to date of establishment 
 
Pr
e-
19
23
 
19
23
-3
9 
19
40
-4
4 
19
45
-4
9 
19
50
-5
4 
19
55
-5
9 
19
60
-6
4 
19
65
-6
9 
19
70
-7
4 
19
75
-7
9 
19
80
 
Sivas 5 1 7 18 21 24 60 105 348 536 149 
Çorum 1 11 21 33 70 72 152 170 388 783 187 
Source: DİE (1980) 
 
